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LEGISLATIVE EPILOGUE
CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1995, S. 1122
This Act seeks to amend federal copyright law to provide greater copyright
protection by broadening the scope of the criminal copyright provisions. The Act,
currently pending approval by the Senate Judiciary Committee, was introduced
by Senator Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT). To date, the Act has not attracted any bi-
partisan support.
The Act seeks to punish anyone who infringes a copyrighted work for "finan-
cial gain," which, under the Act, is defined as the receipt of anything of value,
including the receipt of other copyrighted works. Courts have previously inter-
preted "financial gain" to include only monetary gain by the alleged infringer.
By broadening the definition, the Act significantly extends copyright protection
for potential plaintiffs. In keeping with the broader scope of protection, plaintiffs
will have five years, rather than the current three year statute of limitations, in
which to file suit in federal court.
Punishment under the Act is also more severe. The proposed Act provides for
a fine and up to five years of imprisonment for infringing a copyright for pur-
poses of commercial advantage. Anyone convicted under the new Act could face
up to ten years of imprisonment for a subsequent act of infringement. However,
incarceration under the proposal is limited to infringements of copyrighted works
which have a retail value of more than $5,000. Not many copyrighted works,
taken individually, meet this valuation requirement. Thus, it seems that this pro-
posal is aimed at the infringer who engages in mass-reproduction and distribution
of copyrighted works. With the development of the internet and other compara-
ble technological devices, this behavior could become more frequent.
The Act also authorizes the United States Sentencing Commission to alter the
sentencing guidelines to insure that copyrighted works are adequately protected.
The Act specifically requires that the punishment for defendants convicted under
the new Act must be "sufficiently stringent" to deter future infringements and
must adequately reflect the retail value and quantity of the infringed works. To
insure the punishment accurately reflects the injury to the plaintiff's work, the
Act permits the copyright owner to submit a victim impact statement to identify
the scope and extent of the injury and loss due to the defendant's actions.
FAIRNEsS IN MUSICAL LICENSING ACT OF 1995, H.R. 789
This Act, currently awaiting approval from the House Judiciary Committee,
has drawn wide bi-partisan support. The proposal seeks to clarify the "home-
owner exception" to the public performance rights of the copyright owner in a
sound recording. The Act revises federal copyright law to provide that commu-
nication by electronic device does not constitute copyright infringement unless an
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admission fee is charged to see or hear the transmission or the transmission is
not properly licensed. Moreover, a performance or display in a commercial es-
tablishment does not constitute infringement if it is incidental to the "main pur-
pose" of the establishment.
The Act allows a "performance rights society," such as BMI or ASCAP, to
set an appropriate fee for the licensing of its copyrighted works. If the parties are
unable to agree on the fee to be paid for the users' past or future performance of
musical works, the user is entitled to binding arbitration of the disagreement
pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association in lieu of any other
dispute resolution mechanism. The Arbitrator must determine a fair and reason-
able fee and impose a penalty for any infringement of the copyright owner's
rights. The Act specifically provides that the Arbitrator's decision is binding on
both parties and, therefore, the plaintiff will be estopped from seeking judicially
determined remedies if he/she opts for the Arbitration process.
The Act also attempts to reduce the amount of litigation over blanket licens-
ing fees frequently offered by performing rights societies. According to the pro-
posal, blanket fees can no longer be the exclusive means by which a broadcaster
can purchase rights to perform or broadcast works in a society's repertoire. The
performing rights society must offer the broadcaster a per programming license
to perform nondramatic musical works. The license must be offered on terms on
conditions that provide for an economically and administratively viable alterna-
tive to blanket licenses. The performing rights society cannot compel a broad-
caster to report every performance of nondramatic musical works to the society,
but the Act permits a broadcaster to bring an action in federal court to require
compliance with the reporting requirement.
One of the most significant revisions of existing copyright law is the Act's
requirement that each performing rights society make available free online com-
puter access to copyright and licensing information for each work in its reper-
toire. To ensure compliance with this mandate, the Act directs the performing
rights society to publish a semi-annual printed directory of each title in its reper-
toire and provide copies of the publication to anyone who requests such informa-
tion. The Attorney General must report annually to Congress on the activities
relating to the supervision and enforcement of the Act.
FLORIDA SENATE BILL No. 72
This Bill, which is not yet titled, provides several penalties for desecrating a
United States flag. The Bill makes such an act punishable as a first-degree mis-
demeanor to any person who knowingly casts contempt upon any flag by public-
ly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling upon a United States flag.
The Bill further specifies that a "flag" includes any color, symbol, picture, or
representation which, to the average person, would denote the flag of the United
States of America.
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NEW YoRK ASSEMBLY BILL No. 3661
The Bill seeks to amend New York State civil rights law by adding a new
section identifying a specific right of publicity. The Bill provides that the right of
publicity is a property right that every natural person owns, and unauthorized use
of this right gives rise to a cause of action. The Bill was passed to the Assembly
Committee on Governmental Operations on January 3, 1996, where it has drawn
multiple sponsors.
The Bill codifies common law jurisprudence regarding the descendability and
free alienation of the right of publicity. Moreover, the Bill recognizes that a right
of publicity can exist in a person's name, voice, signature, photograph, or visual
image, and the individual or successor-in-interest may maintain an action in New
York State Supreme Court to prevent and retrain any unauthorized use. The
plaintiff may also recover a civil penalty of at least $750 for any injuries sus-
tained by reason of such use. If the plaintiff can prove that the defendant know-
ingly and intentionally violated the plaintiff's right of publicity, the jury has
discretion to award punitive damages and attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
However, the Bill also limits an individual's right of publicity. First, the Bill
specifically provides that the right of publicity expires fifty years from the
person's date of death, regardless of whether the person commercially exploited
the right during his/her lifetime. For example, this provision would allow an
advertising company to use a celebrity's voice fifty years after the individual's
death without seeking permission from the successor-in-interest. With respect to
a commercial use, the Bill provides that the user must obtain consent if the use
is "so directly connected with the commercial sponsorship or the paid advertising
for a product or service."
The Bill also addresses the recent controversy California courts have confront-
ed with determining the extent of the right of publicity when an advertiser uses a
simulation or impersonation of a celebrity.' The Bill explicitly requires the user
to obtain consent, even if the commercial contains a disclaimer stating that the
representation is a simulation and not the actual celebrity. Therefore, the new
Bill precludes the potential for an advertiser to circumvent an individual's right
of publicity by using an impersonation of that individual. In this manner, the Bill
vindicates the rights of celebrities while also encouraging a more informed pub-
lic.
1. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Electronics, 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that an ad-
vertiser violated Vanna White's right of publicity by broadcasting a commercial featuring a robot
wearing a blond wig situated on a game show set resembling the "Wheel of Fortune" television show
on which White is a co-host) But c.f. Wendt v. Host Int'l, 50 F.3d 18 (9th Cir. 1995) (the same
court, three years later, held that the right of publicity of the plaintiffs, two stars of the now-syndi-
cated television sit-com "Cheers," was not violated when the defendants used two robots in its fran-
chise of airport bars).
1996]
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NEW YORK ASSEMBLY BILL 9632
This Bill, commonly referred to as the "anti-moshing statute," seeks to estab-
lish a cause of action for persons injured by moshing-related activities. The Bill,
introduced on March 26, 1996, is currently awaiting approval from the New
York State Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
The Bill proposes to amend general obligations law by adding a new section
11-106. Section Two of the Bill defines "moshing" broadly as any of several
activities occurring within one hundred feet of the area in which a musical group
is performing. These activities include, but are not limited to, kicking, pushing,
hitting, shoving, jumping onto other persons, and colliding with other persons.
The legislature clearly leaves open the possibility that other activities may also
constitute moshing, leaving it up to the judicial system to define the contours of
the law.
Should the Bill pass in its current form, concert goers and other persons in-
jured by moshing activities will have a cause of action against the person causing
the injuries and the owner of the premises in which the musical group per-
formed. More drastically, the Bill explicitly allows the recovery of compensatory
damages, including those for loss of property, means of support, and personal
injuries, as well as exemplary damages. Additionally, the right to recover tran-
scends the death of either the moshing "victim" or the defendant. The family of
the victim may bring suit for wrongful death against the mosher, and conversely,
victims may recover from the estate of a deceased defendant.
MISSISSIPPI HOUSE BILL No. 671
Currently awaiting approval by the Mississippi House Ways and Means Com-
mittee, this Bill establishes a sports fund injury board to place a minimum sur-
charge on the cost of admission to school athletic events to be deposited into a
sports injury trust fund. The fund would be used to help injured students pay
certain health care costs resulting from sports-related accidents.
The surcharge would apply to athletic events held at all public educational
institutions, but private schools may elect to impose the surcharge. All institu-
tions that choose to or are required to impose the surcharge must charge an
additional ten cents per ticket which will be sent to the State Tax Commission to
be placed in the special fund. Disbursements will only be made to students who
suffer permanent impairment of physical functions causing or resulting from
traumatic injury while participating in school-sponsored athletic events.
The Bill also establishes a Sports Fund Injury Board to oversee the proper
execution and collection of the ticket surcharge. The Board is to consist of three
members: one representative elected from the State Board of Education, one
member of the State Board for Community and Junior Colleges, and one member
of the Board of Trustees of the State Institutions of Higher Leaming. The Board
must establish rules and an application process for the distribution of funds to
cover the medical costs to student athletes resulting from certain injuries remain-
ing after personal health care insurance and all other health care assistance have
been denied or exhausted.
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MARYLAND HOUSE BILL No. 75
The Bill, introduced on January 10, 1996, and currently pending approval
from the House Committee on Ways and Means, requires an institution of higher
education to allow the recipient of an athletic scholarship sponsored by the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") to pay a specified amount of
his/her education costs. The Bill only applies to students who attend a public
college or university who, during at least three academic years at the institution,
receive a NCAA athletic scholarship and terminate enrollment at the school prior
to obtaining a degree.
If a student meeting the above requirement discontinues enrollment at the
school before completing the institution's degree requirement and, during the
period following termination, does not engage in conduct that would preclude
readmission, that student must be reinstated as a regular full- or part-time student
at the institution. The student must receive financial credit from the school in an
amount equivalent to the lesser of the tuition for a resident student for two aca-
demic years or the amount needed to pay for the academic credits needed to
complete the student's degree requirements.
Allison L. Wapner
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